Abstract-Cyber-physical situation awareness is essential to management of government services and conduct of business processes. In particular, all of the nation's critical infrastructures depend upon proper operation of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices and proper operation of these devices faces threats from possible occurrences of a variety of deliberate and inadvertent cyber events. This paper discusses an ongoing approach for incrementally improving cyber-physical situation awareness by (1) extending previous results for information architecture understanding, (2) sharing protected information among information owners whose knowledge (measurement) of their own state can be improved by choosing to share information with others, and (3) comparing measured cyber-physical system state to predicted cyber-physical system state.
I. BACKGROUND
While maintaining awareness of the situation (operational status) of cyber assets is essential, cyber situational awareness alone is insufficient to properly perform network operations. Prioritization of network services, including cyber security services, must necessarily be determined by the impacts which those services have on enterprise processes, such as critical infrastructures. Thus, national efforts in cyber security awareness should include careful and repeated analyses of interdependencies between cyber events, physical outcomes, and cyber approximations of physical outcomes. The evolutionary nature of cyber capabilities is driven by the continuing information systems revolution and necessarily relegates each estimate of the cyber-physical situation as well as the tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures for estimating the cyber-physical situation to a limited interval of temporalspatial validity. Thus, there is a continuing need for incremental fielding of capabilities for estimating the cyberphysical situation.
For decades the Department of Defense has recognized the operational impacts, indeed the disruptive effects, of the ongoing information systems revolution on weapons capabilities and on the command and control of joint and coalition forces. More recently, the effects of the information systems revolution on political, social, economic, and cultural changes across the globe have become apparent. We currently have no means for objectively assessing (predicting) the outcomes, or the rate of change of the outcomes, for which the information systems revolution will continue to alter relative military capabilities for offensive, defensive, and stability operations or associated changes in political, social, economic, and cultural interdependencies across the globe. Without a capability for assessing current changes due to the continuing information systems revolution, we will not be able to improve the security of cyberspace since our models of systems dynamics will be faulty and will lead to system failures and subsequent exploitation of those failures. The White House recently released the strategic plan for the federal cybersecurity research and development program [1] which outlines the national plan for achieving a trustworthy cyberspace. One focus area of this plan aims to achieve a "deep understanding of cyberspace." As part of the effort to achieve a deep understanding of cyberspace, the plan asserts that "Actions in cyberspace are instantaneous…" and declares that if we are to "… manage our moving target capabilities effectively and instantaneously…" then "…we must greatly enhance our ability to monitor, model, analyze, and understand our own system, the systems in cyberspace with which it interacts, and the threat environment at that point in time." The focus of this paper is to discuss development of a capability for monitoring, analyzing, and understanding present and future states of cyber-physical domains of interest. The paper describes a means to incrementally improve understanding of the relationships between cyber-physical actions/events and the effects of those actions/events. We will focus on relationships between causes and effects for the case of human-in-the-loop feedback control systems in which there is always some propagation delay that occurs between a control action being taken and the effect of that control action being propagated throughout the system under control. In case of feedback control systems, cyber-physical actions are not instantaneous in either propagating throughout a system or in producing effects. Furthermore, in many cases, increasing the latency associated with control action propagation for feedback control systems may cause the controlled system to become unstable.
The major efforts underway to exploit information system efficiencies to improve government and business processes are repeatedly discussed in the news media [2] and expected to continue. Thus, there is a continuing need for incremental fielding of capabilities for estimating the cyber-physical situation. The approach proposed here for achieving a capability for incremental fielding of tools for estimating the cyber-physical situation is to achieve a science and a framework for objective experimentation and subjective validation of compositions of components comprising an approximation of the behaviors of the domain of interest.
II. APPROACH

A. Overview
The approach discussed here is to: (1) extend previous results for information architecture understanding to compare alternative information architectures, (2) share appropriate protected information among information owners whose knowledge (measurement) of their own state can be improved by choosing to share information among information owners, and (3) compare measured cyber-physical system state to predicted cyber-physical system state.
B. Compare alternative information architectures:
To realize a current "estimate of the situation" for a domain of interest we can:
1. Begin by identifying a (set of) system invariant(s) which determine component equilibrium points around which system rates of change tend to zero and then proceed to build a set of software architectures for the distributed, real-time problem space by repeatedly:
a. 1. Identifying the level above which system behavior is to be determined by modifying logical parameters only and partition the problem space (tasks) into appropriate higher-level functional modules using event-based models (i.e. capture the enterprise logical dynamics and compare the logical model behaviors with observed logical behaviors), a. 2. Below the level identified in step a.1, partitioning the problem space (tasks) into functional modules, some strictly eventbased models, some a mixture of eventbased models and differential-algebraicequation-based models (i.e. capture the enterprise physical dynamics and compare the physical model behaviors with observed physical behaviors).
b. Assigning modules to a computational structure (usually pipe and filter computational style), and c. Establishing communication between modules.
2. Choosing a set of quality attributes with which to assess the architectures (pick success criteria), 3 . Choosing a set of concrete tasks which test the desired quality attributes, and 4. Evaluating the degree to which each architecture provides support for each task.
Returning to step 1. [3]
C. Share appropriate protected information: An essential step in creating and maintaining an estimate of the cyber-physical situation among diverse organizations (e.g. coalition warfare partners, smart grid entities, international telecommunication entities …) is to share protected information. Our effort will extend recent results in sharing protected information among network nodes based upon information owner declaration of "need to share" protection policies while maintaining existing security policies based upon "need to know" information protection policies . [4] D. Compare measured cyber-physical system state to predicted cyber-physical system state: The driving force behind the continuing difficulties in creating and maintaining an estimate of the cyber-physical situation is the fact that the ongoing information systems revolution continues to outpace security capabilities since costeffectiveness drives implementations and system security as a consideration does not compete with lower installed cost for implementation decisions. Current challenges include those technical gaps listed in a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsored study from a few years ago [5] . That study concludes that we need to increase science and technology capabilities to:
1. Reduce opportunities for attack 2. Increase likelihood of detection of a cyber attack, 3. Ensure the operators can recover from an attack, 4. Implement a risk framework for certification and accreditation, and 5. Identify the security perimeter for assessing system security. Comparing alternative architectures, sharing appropriate protected information and comparing measured cyber-physical system state to predicted cyber-physical system state is domain-specific. That is, the actual construction of system models, sharing of system information, and comparison of measured system outcomes to predicted system outcomes is necessarily based upon building "close enough" models of the domain of interest. We propose to study the Smart Grid domain as a representative domain of national interest whose proper operation may be affected by deliberate or inadvertent cyber and/or physical events. A more detailed example is provided below concerning using the architecture comparison approach outlined above to improve cyber-physical situation awareness tools available for management of the smart grid.
III. EXAMPLE: CHALLENGES IN ACHIEVING CYBER-PHYSICAL SITUATION AWARENESS FOR THE SMART GRID
A central challenge in hybrid system control is the fact that even though it has been mathematically shown that solutions exist to the composed problem (compositions of discrete constraints on system evolution and continuous constraints on system evolution) constructive approaches for building solutions to the composed problem have yet to be discovered. An early attempt to explicitly include notions of time in simulations and implementations of mixed-mode systems was the Signal language developed in France [6] . However, the Signal language [7] has had continuing issues with combinatorial explosion in constructing solutions to combining discrete and continuous simulation tasks.
A. Overview
As indicated in Part II the approach is to: (1) compare alternative information architectures, (2) share appropriate protected information (3) compare measured cyber-physical system state to predicted cyber-physical system state. Here we give an example of applying the first of the three steps.
B. Compare alternative information architectures
The majority of this section has been taken from a paper prepared with Dr. Aaron St Leger as part of a project sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and co-authored by Dr. Dean Frederick [8] . This section discusses a framework for comparison of alternative smart grid architectures and how the flexible nature of the Matlab/Simulink toolset enables (1) evaluation of alternative smart grid architectures, (2) comparison of alternative hypotheses concerning WMD effects on smart grid dynamics, (3) Sharing of models and results with other research and development projects seeking to understand smart grid dynamics, and (4) potential for transition of results to practice.
Step 1.a Partition situation assessment of the smart grid problem space:
Developing a suitable model for smart grid simulation is challenging as the smart grid is still emerging and evolving as technology and control techniques continue to improve. The modeling methodology presented here is developed in a flexible fashion to allow for implementation of new technology and control schemes. The smart grid as defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology [9] was used as a starting point for modeling. In our project we are primarily concerned with components that have a large effect on the grid. In other words, items that if compromised would have wide reaching effects (generation, transmission, components of operations required for maintaining system stability, wide area control techniques and the supporting infrastructure, etc.). As noted above, the step in architecture comparison recently added to the architecture comparison methodology is to first identify the fixed points (invariant conditions) around which the architecture components can be safely assumed to be stationary (non-time-varying) over the course of the modeling and simulation application period. For the case of the smart grid, the existence of the national-level synchronous machine which comprises the power grid means that the primary physical system invariant constraint is the condition for operation of the grid at a frequency of 60 cycles per second (Hertz). Of course, one of the goals of the modeling and simulation effort is to precisely identify those system components and feedback loops which maintain (control) the frequency of operation at 60 Hz and experiment with those effects which might cause the frequency to vary enough to significantly affect the proper operation of the grid. A logical invariant condition (fixed point) is that the grid operates at a profit for the participating individuals and corporations (i.e. homeowners will "opt in" to smart grid operational constraints to save money and corporations will "opt in" to increase profits). The system architecture must meet system requirements for successful completion of the power system enterprise process interactions summarized in Figure 1 under both nominal conditions and stressed conditions (failure modes). Figure 1 reflects the discrete-event signal nature of the problem in depicting the logical partitioning of smart grid activities. The Bulk Generation processes as well as the Transmission processes and Distribution processes represented in Figure 1 are in fact constrained by the physics of electrical power general and distribution so the component models of these processes are necessarily mixed-signal (or hybrid control)
processes. An implementation of the smart grid will be comprised of a hardware architecture, a communication architecture (communication network) and a software architecture (application network). The smart grid will be controlled at the top level by the various control systems with humans-in-the-loop (social networks) operated by local utilities and Independent System Operators (ISOs).
Step 1.b Assign functional modules to computational structure:
We initially experimented with the SimPowerSystems extension [10] to the Simulink tool since this enables direct construction of hybrid system models by linking the discrete-event simulation capabilities of Simulink with the continuous-time simulation capabilities of Matlab. However, it turns out that the lower-level files which define the details of the continuous-time simulations are not available as source files for extension by research and development projects. Thus, a decision has been made to extend the Power System Toolbox [11]. This toolbox is based on Matlab files which are available for modification. We will explicitly compose the Power System Toolbox Matlab files into modules which can be executed as Simulink modules which comply with hybrid constraints.
Step 1.c Establish Communication Between Modules:
Alternative communication architectures continue to be discussed and constructed [12] where the use of power line communication components and Internet or intranet communication components are frequently mentioned. Alternative software architecture styles include: Main/Subroutine, layered (distributed), data abstraction (object-oriented), pipe & filter, repository (blackboard), and event-based (implicit invocation of procedures). The software architecture will probably be required to work with many different hardware architecture configurations, including different numbers of major components. We are explicitly modeling communication components using Matlab/Simulink since we anticipate that a number of the failure modes of the smart grid will include those associated with failure of communication
Step 2: Choose a set of quality attributes:
Since our project is focused on understanding the effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the smart grid the quality attributes are those which measure the performance of the smart grid due to anomalous conditions. We have initially chosen to explicitly measure power flow and current and voltage values over time in response to step changes in component conditions. Also, as discussed above, in order to maintain frequency control of system dynamics for power generation and distribution systems, the frequency is also explicitly measured.
Step 3. Choose a set of tasks:
The tasks chosen for the architecture is to enable implementation of the smart grid. The definition of smart grid capabilities are those defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and details are provided in [10] . Our project is explicitly focused on understanding smart grid failure modes due to WMD effects so our architecture choices are made with a view towards making clear those failures which are due to logical errors (logical failure modes) and those which are due to physical dynamics of the smart grid (continuous system failure modes).
Step 4. Evaluate the degree with which alternative architectures support the tasks:
The Matlab/Simulink models allow for rigorous system modeling and simulation and construction of repeatable experiments from system models and system input data sets.
Initial results for results which match those from existing models is discussed in [10] . Initial results indicate that the approach does enable incremental construction of smart grid models which can be verified against data sets under construction (e.g. the synchrophasor data base [13] ). For the problem of evaluating the potential effects of WMD on the smart grid, it is expected that different potential effects will have dramatically different effects on smart grid dynamics. For example, an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) which is estimated to cover a wide area will have a set of consequences that are very different than the set of consequences due to an explosion at a critical juncture of communication network capabilities and information network capabilities. It may be the case that an architecture implementation that is more capable against an EMP event may be less capable against an explosion event.
Step 5. Return to step 1
The smart grid project is just beginning the second year of a three year effort. We expect to make the models and data sets used in the project available on the web for other researchers to repeat our results and, if interested, expand the models and architectures under investigation.
IV. CONCLUSION We have described initial efforts to establish tools and techniques for evaluating alternative control architectures for large-scale, distributed systems. More work is needed for tools and techniques to support development and deployment of such systems. National efforts in cyber security awareness should include careful and repeated analyses of interdependencies between cyber events, physical outcomes, and cyber approximations of physical outcomes. The evolutionary nature of cyber capabilities is driven by the continuing information systems revolution and necessarily relegates each estimate of the cyber-physical situation as well as the tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures for estimating the cyber-physical situation to a limited interval of temporal-spatial validity. Thus, there is a continuing need for incremental fielding of capabilities for estimating the cyber-physical situation. The approach proposed here for achieving a capability for incremental fielding of tools for estimating the cyber-physical situation is to achieve a science and a framework for objective experimentation and subjective validation of compositions of components comprising an approximation of the behaviors of the domain of interest. Previous results indicated that each domain of interest will need to be individually understood (i.e. predict future domain states) in order to predict future states of complex systems comprised of compositions of component domains.
